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Abstract: The so-called »theory of I’tibariat«, as formulated by Muhammad Hussein Tabataba’i, 
is unprecedented in the philosophical and theological tradition of Islamic thinking. »I’tibariat«, 
i.e. »conventions«, are related to what has been necessitated and conventioned by people. 
I’tibariat can differ among different groups of people and usually vary from one culture 
to another, but at the same time, they have some main common aspects. Allamah asserts 
that many cultural and religious conceptions have their roots in I’tibariat. He explains how 
these conventions are being made by people in order to fulfil their spiritual and material 
necessities. This justifies how cultural and religious categories and concepts are different 
cross-culturally and inter-religiously. The analysis of religious language as a product of ima-
ginative power of human intellect can testify that religious diversity is a function of the cir-
cumstances of people’s lives. With this explanation, interreligious dialogue can be attained 
first and foremost on the presumption that mutual understanding is possible through the 
language which is principally I’tibari.
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Povzetek: T. i. teorija I’tibariat, ki jo je zasnoval Muhammad Hussein Tabataba’I, v filozof­
ski in teološki tradiciji islamskega mišljenja nima predhodnika. »I’tibariat«, tj. »konvencije«, 
je povezan s tem, kar ljudje potrebujejo in o čemer so se dogovorili. »I’tibariat« se lahko med 
različnimi skupinami ljudi razlikuje in se običajno od kulture do kulture razlikuje, hkrati 
pa ima nekatere skupne vidike. Allamah trdi, da ima več kulturnih in religioznih konceptov 
svoje korenine v »I’tibariat«. Razloži, kako ljudje ustvarijo konvencije, da zadostijo svojim 
duhovnim in materialnim potrebam. To pojasni, zakaj so kulturne in religiozne kategorije 
ter koncepti med kulturami in religijami različni. Analiza religioznega jezika kot produkta 
imaginativne moči človeškega intelekta lahko pokaže, da je religiozna raznolikost funkcija živ­
ljenjskih okoliščin ljudi. S to razlago se lahko medreligijski dialog najprej in predvsem doseže 
s predpostavko, da je vzajemno razumevanje mogoče skozi jezik, ki je prvenstveno I’tibariat.
Ključne besede: Allamah Tabataba’i, I’tibariat, medreligijski dialog
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Introduction
Grand Ayatollah Allamah Sayyed Muhammad Husayn Tabataba’i (1903–
1981), who is commonly known as Allamah Tabataba’i (shortly Allamah), 
was one of the most prominent thinkers of contemporary Islamic philo­
sophy and Shia Twelver Islam. It is noteworthy that for a number of years, 
Allamah Tabataba’i had been participating in a series of discussions with 
Henry Corbin, a French thinker, in which comparative studies were appli­
ed specially on gnostic and mystical teachings of some major religions.1 
Allamah is commonly known for his book Tafsir al-Mizan, a twenty­vo­
lume work of Quranic interpretation, which is an interpretation (Tafsir) 
of Quran with Quran and on which he had worked for about two decades, 
from 1954 to 1972 (Algar 2006).
Allamah has written several works on variety of subjects, including the 
major and famous works on philosophy, theology, mysticism, and inter­
pretation. The main focus of this article is on the works in which the idea 
of I’tibariat is proposed and developed.
1 I’tibar: Definition and Types
Let’s start with Allamah’s important statements dealing with the definiti­
on and the territory of the notion of I’tibar. Based on his account, I’tibar 
is ascribing or giving (I’ta) that what is principally imagined (Hadd) and 
acknowledged (Hokm) of something to another thing that lacks that 
(Al­Tabataba’i 1428, 346–347). When one, for example, says that »Watson 
is lion« he is ascribing to Watson that what belongs to the real lion. This 
kind of ascription is similar to what we may commonly know of metaphor 
in literary texts; however, it should be noted that Allamah’s understanding 
of I’tibari has basically nothing to do with linguistic metaphorical represen­
tation. Later on, it will be clarified how we can regard I’tibar as a conventi­
on which basically occurs unintentionally. Being originally unintentional, 
1 For some of their main discussions, see Dialogues with Professor Corbin, 1387 (A.H. Solar; Persian: 
Majmoeh Mozakerat ba professor Hanri Kurban‎), prepared by Sayyed Hadi Khosroshahi. Qom: 
Entesharat Daftear Tabliqat Eslami Hoze Elmiye Qom.
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I’tibar is a natural activity which is performed in order to guarantee our 
survival. 
Allamah states that I’tibariat are either pre­societal or post­societal 
(Tabataba’i 1364 A.H. /Solar/, 197). Pre­societal I’tibariat are the conven­
tions that can be made on a personal level, quite independently of the 
man’s social life. For instance, we necessarily conceive that our knowledge 
of things is in accordance with, or let’s say corresponds to, the concrete 
and objective world; we just naturally take for granted a necessity for this 
correspondence (in Persian: Asl­e Motabeat­e Elm or Hojjiate Elm va Qaṭ’); 
however, in fact we cannot, by ourselves, prove that the objects we perceive 
are exactly the same as what exist in external world. For another example, 
take the necessity which is precondition of performing any action which 
is regarded by Allamah as another kind of I’tibar. To elucidate this kind 
of I’tibar in a more familiar way, one can notice in an introspective way that 
one cannot perform any action unless one, after all, chooses to decisively 
perform it; this final decision contains in itself the necessity of performing 
the action. (197–198) According to this analysis, the I’tibar of necessity is a 
convention which is primarily being made by our own nature in order 
to secure our survival. When we are starved and inclined to eat the most 
desirable edibles, then decide to eat and finally start eating, this »realised« 
decision is, in final analysis, raised according to an I’tibar which is made 
in order to fulfil one of our primary needs (Al­Tabataba’i 1428 A.H. /Lunar/, 
347). More precisely, we, let’s say, take the causal necessity between food 
and the fulfilment of a primary need and apply it to the relationship betwe­
en eating foodstuff and relieving hunger (Talebzadeh 1389).
For Allamah, there is another kind of I’tibar which is dependent on our 
condition as living beings within society. Post­societal I’tibariat are the 
conventions that need to be made in order to establish our social life; for 
example, I’tibar of property, well known in the current capitalist world. 
According to Allamah, a phenomenon known as Language is I’tibari. 
(Tabataba’i 1364 A.H. /Solar/, 220; Al­Tabataba’i 1428 A.H. /Lunar/, 348–
349) Later on, it will be explained how Allamah base the very existence 
of language on a particular type of I’tibar.
Moreover, Allamah introduces another criterion according to which I’tibar 
is divided into two different kinds of convention: »it is either shared, fixed 
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and unchanging such as the I’tibar that our knowledge is in accordance 
with concrete and objective world, or personal and changing like I’tibar 
of personal beauties or/and uglinesses« (Al­Tabataba’i 1428 A.H. /Lunar/, 
350; Tabataba’i 1364, 210).
2 Conventionality of Language
We can draw a sketch of interreligious dialogue in accordance with 
the function of I’tibar in religious language, as established in Allamah 
Tabataba’i’s theory of I’tibariat. 
As humans, just on the threshold of becoming social beings, we prima­
rily need to realize how to convey our intentions to the others by trying 
to contact them in any possible communication manner. If the purpose 
of our nature is to bring us to our desired perfection which is not fulfilled 
without socializing – because individuals help each other to realize their 
potentialities – there should exist some ways to communicate with others. 
(Al­Tabataba’i 1428, 356–357)
The notion of I’tibar or convention has been employed by Tabataba’i for 
explaining the relationship between meaning(s) and word(s) in language. 
As mentioned earlier, I’tibar is defined by Allamah as ascribing that what 
principally belongs to one thing to another thing. Technically speaking, it is 
ascribing or giving that what is principally imagined and acknowledged 
of one thing to another thing that lacks it. (346–347) 
The language (Kalam) is conventional representation of what we have 
inside ourselves (in Arabic: Ma fi al­Zamir, i.e. mental meanings) by words. 
Words represent mental meanings in the same manner as mental meanin­
gs represent external objects. (Al­Tabataba’i 1395 A.H. /Lunar/, 307–308)
Allamah states that the fixed relationship between a word and a meaning 
is based on I’tibar (Al­Tabataba’i 1361 A.H. /Solar/, 16). He asserts that 
through I’tibar, a word becomes a meaning. Thus, this becoming (called 
‘Waz’a’ by Allamah) is I’tibari or conventional (30). That is to say, a word, 
after being used for a while, moves us directly to the intended meaning 
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in a way that we usually do not realize we are hearing or reading words; 
we just grasp meanings.
3 Communicative Initiatives
Allamah suggests that if we contemplate on what people call ‘society’, 
we understand that the existence of the society is a function of what God 
has created in human nature which is to comprehend that we, as indi­
gent human beings with a variety of imperfections, necessities and needs, 
would not be able to fulfill all our needs without help from other people. 
This is why we began, for the first time, to communicate with our fel­
lowmen. (Al­Tabataba’i 1393 A.H. /Lunar/, 337)
First social communicative activities of human beings can be seen in their 
primary sensory interaction, as infants, with their mothers. Tabataba’i sta­
tes that perceptual concepts are the easiest ones to be conveyed to the 
others as the examples of these concepts can be referred to by our senses; 
sound plays an intermediary role to refer to them. (Al­Tabataba’i, 1361 
A.H. /Solar/, 17). When babies are hungry they start crying; when they are 
distressed they make different kinds of sounds to let their mothers know 
what they are in need of. (Tabataba’i 1364 A.H. /Solar/, 223, 224). 
Repetition of application of sounds as substitutes of words paves the 
ground for mutual understanding in which individuals can directly un­
derstand and reach the meanings by hearing the words, even without 
giving attention to the words themselves, which is some sort of association 
of ideas. In this stage, a word and its meaning become identical by I’tibar. 
(Tabataba’i 1364 A.H. /Solar/, 223)
Allamah alleges that at this stage where sounds play an important role 
in communication of parties,2 not only meanings, but also feelings like 
love, compassion, enmity etc. are usually expressed through sounds 
or sometimes body gestures.
2 Including animals and humans: »using sounds and voices for conveying intended meanings is not 
restricted to humans but is also a communicative way of animals, especially birds« (Tabataba’i 1364 
A.H. /Solar/, 223).
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Representation of non­perceptual concepts is not totally irrelevant to the 
existence of perceptual ones. Some primary non­perceptual concepts and 
words are made by referring to their corresponding objective matters. 
For instance, the names of some animals would be coined by an analogy 
to their sounds. (Al­Tabataba’i, 1361 A.H. /Solar/, 18) 
One of the consequences of Allamah’s above­mentioned explanations 
is the belief that words are being conventioned for bearing meanings. 
Being conventioned means being employed cognitively – but not ne­
cessarily on purpose. According to this approach, the language is I’tibari 
(or conventional) and its cognitive conventional process is prior to its 
linguistic manifestation.
4 Religious Language and I’tibar
Tabataba’i affirms that the language of religion, especially the language that 
has been used in the sacred books, functions exactly the same as the lan­
guage we, as humans, are equipped with, which is the language of I’tibar. 
In other words, the language used by religions for disclosing religious 
truths and teaching them to the believers is the same language as the one 
that is basically used by humans for conveying meanings to other people. 
In religious language, meanings/messages are to be conveyed to their 
audience by making an expansion and elaboration in ordinary linguistic 
meanings. (Al­Tabataba’i 1393 A.H. /Lunar/, 16–17)
Allamah believes that the religious language (called Kalam Allah in Islam) 
is not different, in its grammar and vocabulary, from our natural language. 
The major difference comes from the contents of meanings and concepts 
which are intended to be conveyed with this common and typical (religi­
ous) language. (78–79)
As pointed out, in the process of establishment of our natural language, 
words are conventioned for meanings. Here, meanings are either sensory 
meanings and perceptual concepts or non­sensory meanings, which are 
simultaneously relevant to the former by nature. In religious language, 
typical words and sentences are conventioned for religious, or let’s say, 
spiritual meanings. (17) 
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This implies that the language of religion contains verbal expressions of a 
familiar language, because they need to be used by everybody, and all 
people, depending on their own capacities and capabilities, must benefit 
from them. People start with transparent layers (in Arabic: Zahir) of reli­
gious language and, if they are perseverant, gradually understand deeper 
meanings and principles (in Arabic: Osul) of its words and expressions. 
(Tabataba’i 1388 A.H. /Solar/, 74–75)
Allamah’s repeated emphasis on the fact that the language of religion 
is the simplest form of language being used by all people, and the fact 
that natural language works according to conventions both clearly sug­
gest that religious language is conventional. »Everything that has been 
taught and explained by religion, including the knowledge of preborn life 
of human beings and of their life after death, was done so through the lan­
guage of I’tibar.« (Tabataba’i 1360, 6) Allamah substanciated his statement 
by saying that, since humans’ situation before and after this temporal world 
is a personal situation (which even lacks an environment that is prerequisi­
te of any interaction), rather than a social one, I’tibar has no place for men 
under those circumstances. Therefore, if the language of religion describes 
the mentioned situations and discloses some knowledge and truth about 
them for us as living creatures of this temporal and non­personal world, 
so to speak, it is inevitable that this language be I’tibari (6).
In the language of religions, perceptual meanings are employed as allego­
ries which can help people think over and then understand transcendental 
(hidden) meanings (Tabataba’i, 1388, 49–50). That is to say, in the language 
of religion, religious meanings are understood through sensory concepts. 
(Al­Tabataba’i 1393 A.H. /Lunar/, 62) Allamah’s explanation implies that 
if we are going to understand the truths and intended meanings of religio­
us teachings, we have to begin with interpretation of the language of I’tibar 
which is ubiquitous in the language of religion. Through interpretation 
we can find our way to the real meanings of words. 
5 Religions and Dialogue 
From the above, it follows that understanding of the language of different 
religious traditions and intended meanings of their linguistic expressions 
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is possible, since based on Allamah’s explanation, religions use the same 
language, i.e. ordinary natural language which has the same function and 
structure across religions. It is a shared, common and natural language 
that can be understood by all people. It is not a heavenly language with 
quite different basics and structures; otherwise, religion would not be a 
guidance for all people, especially for the perplexed. This is not to say, 
however, that all religions teach the same doctrines and meanings, but 
that learning different languages and dialects, in spite of the difference 
between vocabularies and grammars, is enough to learn the language 
of religions and paves the way for at least a basic knowledge of intended 
meanings behind words and expressions. 
6 Mutual Understanding
Now, building upon the relation between language and I’tibar, the concep­
tual sketch of an interreligious dialogue would be given based on Allamah 
Tabataba’i’s thought. As it was shown, I’tibar is a human product and it is 
the basis of our natural language. Religious language does not originally 
differ from the phenomenon that is commonly referred to as »language«. 
Consequently, it is quite possible for one and all to listen to the voices of re­
ligions through linguistic understanding. For this purpose, counterparts 
who are going to be engaged in interreligious dialogue, first, need to try 
to understand the meanings of the linguistic expressions of their own reli­
gion in a better and clearer way. For a deep understanding, they may need 
to employ hermeneutical insights and interpretational ways to discover 
which meanings are hidden behind and enclosed to the words. It is always 
possible that in case of more abstract notions, the real meaning resists 
to be disclosed. In such situation, it is wise to get assistance from the less 
complicated parts of religious context in order to interpret more abstract 
and complicated words, expressions and sentences. This is a method that 
Allamah Tabataba’i has applied to the interpretation of Quran, the holy 
book of Muslims (1393 A.H. /Lunar/). The same process can be applied 
on other religions. That is to say, we should have at least a basic knowledge 
of the language of other religion, its plain and idiomatic connotations, its 
technical and context­dependent meanings. 
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Interpretation or so­called hermeneutics can have a significant place in in­
terreligious dialogue. According to Tracy (2010), hermeneutics can specify 
the definition of dialogue, its territory, its limitations and its influences to 
»new non­dialogical ways of thinking« and thereby specify interreligious 
dialogue. 
This procedure can be used to understand what other religions say. 
Needless to say, the first and the most important element in any interreli­
gious dialogue is achieving a mutual understanding. If we accept that all 
humans are essentially and basically identical, and realize that the foun­
dations of our languages are fundamentally the same, and finally accept 
that this common language is ubiquitous and prevalent in religions, then 
we can accept a theoretical basis for interreligious dialogue. 
David Tracy (1990) suggests that engaging in a serious interreligious di­
alogue shows us that our thoughts about other religions are not totally 
accurate (27). I understand from Tracy’s statement that interreligious dia­
logue provides us with a more accurate mutual understanding.
According to Shafiq and Abu­Nimer (2011), the goal of dialogue »is not 
to eliminate differences of opinion and conviction, but to gain an un­
derstanding and acceptance of those differences« (1). From this empha­
sis, again, it becomes clear that the most important thing in any dialogue 
is mutual understanding. With a double emphasis: »Dialogue is not about 
seeking to defeat or silence others, but about learning, understanding, 
and increasing one’s knowledge of them.« (1)
Conclusion
A simple contemplation on the meaning of the word »dialogue« and the 
related discussions have so far strongly suggested that a prerequisite of any 
interreligious dialogue is mutual understanding of each other’s similarities 
and differences. For this reason, the role of religious language has been 
emphasized in this paper.
Humans’ lives, their social and interactional behaviours, as well as their 
conventional perceptions are naturally interpenetrated, so to speak. 
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As stated by Allamah, language, culture and even religion are not sepa­
rated from and uninfluenced by our society. We understand each other 
in a conventional way, because our language is I’tibari, i.e. conventional. 
On the one hand, conventions, at least some of them, in one culture and 
its religion might be considered different from the other culture, because 
each of them has different needs and I’tibariat. On the other hand, since 
we are all human beings, the main patterns of our primary needs are 
fundamentally the same. In a nutshell, it is reasonable to say that religious 
believers have some linguistic basic I’tibariat in common which makes 
interreligious dialogue conceivable.
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